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Abstract. How someone can get health insurance without sharing his health in-
formation? How you can get a loan without disclosing your credit score? There 
is a method to certify certain attributes of various data, either this is health met-
rics or finance information, without revealing the data itself or any other kind of 
personal data. This method is known as “zero-knowledge proofs”. 
Zero-Knowledge techniques are mathematical methods used to verify things 
without sharing or revealing underlying data. Zero-Knowledge protocols have 
vast applications from simple identity schemes and blockchains to defense re-
search programs and nuclear arms control. 
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1 Introduction 
Zero-Knowledge proofs (also commonly referred to as ZKPs) are used as security 
protocols through which a digital authentication process can be facilitated without the 
use of any passwords or other sensitive data. As a result of this, no information, either 
from the sender’s or receiver’s end can be compromised in any way. The idea under-
lying zero-knowledge proofs first came to the fore back in 1985, when developers 
Shafi Goldwasser, Charles Rackoff and Silvio Micali [1] presented to the world the 
notion of “knowledge complexity” — a concept that served as a precursor to ZKPs. 
Simply put, ZKP is a probabilistic based verification method, which means it provides 
“fact-like statements” and “statements about personal knowledge” that can accumu-
late to show that the validity of an assertion is overwhelmingly probable. In other 
words, they don’t prove something that simply revealing it would be sufficient, but 
rather verify the knowledge of it. Moreover, the assertion cannot be verified by a third 
party. 
This is especially handy in various situations, e.g. when we want to spend money 
without revealing how much we used or in which currency it was spent. Besides mon-
ey, private information such as date of birth, bank statements, transaction histories, 
education credentials are vitally important. Companies like Facebook and Google 
leverage from this data by using it to optimize their services to better appeal to you, 
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and to re-sell it to other companies. It is prevalent now than ever before the need to 
maintain privacy in a data-based world. 
The paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the methodical ap-
proach used, important literature review and relevant references for this paper in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we will dive deeper to the nuts and bolts of ZKPs and we will 
mention important theorems that drove its evolution. In Section 4 we present notable 
and the most recent use cases of zero-knowledge protocols. In Section 5 and subse-
quently in Section 6 we are discussing known threats and solutions of ZKP technolo-
gies. Finally, we discuss the current state of Zero-knowledge protocols in Section 7 
and conclude in Section 8. 
2 Methodology 
Firstly, we approached from a theoretical point of view the rudiments of the ZKPs 
field. This served not only as a concise presentation of the principles underlining 
ZKPs but also gave us a historical aspect on how these protocols evolved. In this first 
step we consulted Rubinstein-Salzedo’s “Cryptography” as a primer. This book is less 
sophisticated from others but manages to cover substantial topics in cryptography in 
an informal view. Silverman’s “An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography” of-
fered a mathematical approach for ZKPs and notions surrounding their functionality 
such as Complexity Theory and Random Oracle Models. A detailed and descriptive 
approach would require a strong background both in cryptology and in abstract alge-
bra. 
Secondly, we searched mostly online articles and blogs on the current trends and 
technologies on ZKPs protocols since internet is the first place that breakthrough 
methods make headlines. We made sure to accompany all the new implementations 
appearing in this paper with the relevant citations. A contemporary approach is not 
only mandated because the field of ZK applications is still in early stage but also it 
serves as a guide for the aspiring cryptographer or mathematician. 
3 The Principles of Zero-Knowledge Proofs 
We will start this Chapter by presenting two simple examples that demonstrate the 
concept of zero-knowledge proof. 
3.1 Ali Babaa’s Cave (Example #1). 
The first and most important example is inspired by a paper titled “How to Explain 
Zero-Knowledge Protocols to Your Children” [2]. 
Consider, for the sake of example, a cave consisting of a circular tunnel. Diametri-
cally opposite to the entrance of this cave, there is a door which can only be opened 
by a password. Although this situation is probably not a real life scenario, it is quite 
useful in the display of the basic properties of ZKP. Now Peggy (also known as the 
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prover of the statement) knows the password to this door, and she wants to prove this 
to Victor (also known as the verifier of the statement) without actually disclosing it to 
him. They set off to complete the task as follows: 
Peggy goes into a random branch of the cave (that is, left or right). She does this 
without Victor knowing which branch she chose. Standing at the entrance of the cave, 
Victor calls out a random branch (again, either left or right), where he wants Peggy to 
come out from. Providing she really does know the password, she can obey Victor 
every time, using the door if necessary. 
However, if Peggy did not know the password, then she would only be able to re-
turn by the named path if Victor were to give the name of the same path by which she 
had entered. Since Victor would choose left or right at random, she would have a 50% 
chance fooling Victor. If both (prover and verifier) were to repeat the above process 
several times, say 20 times, Peggy’s chance of successfully anticipating all of Victor's 
requests would become vanishingly small. 
Thus, if Peggy repeatedly appears at the exit Victor names, he can conclude that it 
is extremely probable that Peggy does, in fact, know the secret word. 
3.2 Two Balls and the Color-Blind Friend (Example #2).  
Another classic example used to demonstrate ZKP is the following [3]. 
Imagine your friend is color-blind and you have two balls: one red and one green, 
but otherwise identical in their shape and size. To your friend they seem completely 
identical and he is skeptical that they are actually distinguishable. You want to prove 
to him they are in fact differently colored, but nothing else, thus you do not reveal 
which one is the red and which is the green. 
You give the two balls to your friend and he puts them behind his back. Next, he 
takes one of the balls and brings it out from behind his back and displays it. This ball 
is then placed behind his back again and then he chooses to reveal just one of the two 
balls, switching to the other ball with probability 50%. He will ask you, “Did I switch 
the ball?” This whole procedure is then repeated as often as necessary. He knows if he 
switched the ball because he did it himself, and you know if he did (because you can 
see the color) without revealing to him the actual color of the ball. 
The above examples demonstrate an important subtle feature, that of zero-
knowledge. Victor cannot convince anybody else of Peggy’s knowledge about the 
password. If Victor were to create a transcript (e.g. videotape the whole process) that 
could potentially be that of the communication between him and Peggy, it would be 
useless. This transcript would be indistinguishable from a transcript that is entirely 
fabricated by a cheating verifier. An outsider, watching the recording, could argue 
that Peggy and Victor agreed in advance about the sequence of chosen branches.  
Thus, such a recording will certainly never be convincing to anyone but the original 
participants. 
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3.3 Characteristics of ZKPs 
Interactive ZKPs: The examples above are forms of interactive proofs since the 
prover, performed a series of actions to convince the verifier, of a certain fact. The 
problem with interactive proofs is their limited transferability: to prove an ability 
attribute, or possession of secret data to someone else, or to the verifier several times, 
the prover will have to repeat the entire process. 
Interactive ZKPs have further properties, namely Completeness and Soundness. 
Completeness Property: An interactive proof protocol is complete if, given an honest 
prover and an honest verifier, the protocol succeeds with overwhelming probability 
(i.e., the verifier accepts the prover’s claim). 
Soundness Property1: If the prover is lying, then he cannot convince the verifier that 
he is telling the truth, except with some very small probability. 
Zero Knowledge Property: Let’s consider the cave example once again and the vide-
otape (transcript) Victor made. We mentioned that if the recording were to be seen by 
a third party, it would not convince this party for Peggy’s knowledge. Thus, if Victor 
wants to convince a third party, he can ask Peggy to demonstrate the transcript once 
again, but this time it will be the third party who will pick his own sequence of chal-
lenges for Peggy (not Victor’s challenges). If there is a way to forge a proof that is 
indistinguishable from a genuine one (as in the case of the videotape), we say that 
there is a simulator for the proof in question. A proof of knowledge has the zero 
knowledge property if there exists a simulator for the proof. 
Non-interactive2 ZKPs (NIZK): In a non-interactive proof, the prover can deliver a 
proof that anyone can verify for themselves. This relies on the verifier picking a ran-
dom challenge for the prover to solve. 
Cryptographers Fiat and Shamir [4-5] found that an interactive protocol can be 
converted into a non-interactive3 one using a hash function to pick the challenge 
(without any interaction with the verifier). Repeated interaction between the prover 
and verifier becomes unnecessary, since the proof exists in a single message sent from 
prover to verifier. 
                                                          
1  Soundness can be described mathematically as an expected polynomial time algorithm M 
with the following property: if a dishonest prover can with non-negligible probability exe-
cute the protocol with the verifier, then M can be used to extract from this prover the 
knowledge which with overwhelming probability allows subsequent protocol executions. 
2  A Non-interactive, zero-knowledge proof example can be found here 
https://blog.goodaudience.com/understanding-zero-knowledge-
proofs-through-simple-examples-df673f796d99 
3  Only languages in BPP have NIZK proof systems, under suitable hardness assumptions, 
NIZKs exist for all languages in NP. 
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4 Applications 
4.1 Blockchain Use Cases 
So far ZKPs may seem like a conundrum and you might wonder if there are real 
world consequences. In this chapter we will present some important applications. 
Probably, the most prominent use case of Zero-knowledge proofs is within the con-
text of a blockchain ecosystem. It offers a lot of benefits in regard to validating cryp-
tocurrency transactions without disclosing any data related to it - such as where the 
transactions originated from, where it went or how much money was transferred. 
A real-world use case of this technology is Zcash, a crypto platform that employs a 
special iteration of zero-knowledge proofs - called zk-SNARKs - that allow native 
transactions to remain fully encrypted on the blockchain while still being verified 
under the network's consensus rules. 
The possibilities of zk-SNARKs are impressive, you can verify the correctness of 
computations without having to execute them and you will not even learn what was 
executed - just that it was done correctly. zk-SNARK stands for Zero-Knowledge 
Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge [6], “Zero-knowledge” because 
they don’t reveal any knowledge to the verifier apart from ensuring that the transac-
tion is valid, “Succinct” because the size of the proof is small enough to be verified in 
a few milliseconds, “Non-interactive” because the proof consists of a single message 
sent from prover to verifier and “Arguments” because the Soundness Property holds 
true. 
The usual cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, validate their transactions by linking the 
sender and receiver addresses, and input and output values on the public blockchain. 
Instead of exposing the above components, Zcash make use of zk-SNARKs to “ob-
fuscate” them - it diminishes any meaningful connection between sender, receiver and 
amount. 
In a nutshell, if a sender wants to create a shielded transaction, he constructs a 
proof to show that with high probability, the input values sum to the output values for 
each shielded transfer, the sender proves that they have the private spending keys of 
the input notes, giving them the authority to spend and the private spending keys of 
the input notes are cryptographically linked to a signature over the whole transaction, 
in such a way that the transaction cannot be modified by a party who did not know 
these private keys. 
Users of cryptocurrencies often couple them with network-layer privacy enhance-
ments like Tor to level up their anonymity (we should better say pseudonymity in this 
case) with unpleasant results despite their efforts [7], unlikely Zcash does not suffer 
from the same threats. 
4.2 From zk-SNARKs to zk-STARKs 
As this wasn’t enough there is a more developed version of zk-SNARKs, it is called 
zk-STARKs - Zero-Knowledge Scalable Transparent Argument of Knowledge and it 
was introduced in 2018 (very recently) by Eli Ben [8]. 
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Prior to the creation of zk-STARKs, zk-SNARKs required a trusted party to initial-
ly setup the ZK proof system which introduced the vulnerability of those trusted par-
ties compromising the privacy of the entire system (read more about vulnerabilities in 
Section 5). zk-STARKs improve upon this technology by removing the need for a 
trusted setup. In other terms, zk-STARK proofs present a simpler structure in terms of 
cryptographic assumptions. 
The great advantage of zk-STARK is its scalability, meaning it can move computa-
tions and storage off-chain. Off-chain services will be able to generate STARK proofs 
that attest the integrity of off-chain computations and then can be integrated back on 
chain for any interested party to validate the computation. Also, while zk-SNARK 
communication complexity - that is the amount of communication needed to solve a 
problem distributed among two or more parties - increases in a linear fashion, on the 
other side zk-STARK develops in the opposite way, and increase only slightly as the 
computation size grows. The same applies to the verifier complexity. zk-STARKs are 
about 10 times faster than zk-SNARKs as computation size increases. 
4.3 Quantum Resistant 
Quantum computing has become a topic of interest and despite the fact they are char-
acterized with many novel attributes, unfortunately the truth is far from reality. Quan-
tum computers can achieve only special kinds of calculations and some of them could 
exploit today’s cryptographic techniques. Encryption schemes based on RSA and 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography could prove obsolete in the near future. Notice that these 
algorithms rely on private and public key pairings, something that doesn’t apply in the 
case not only of zk-STARKS but also other ZKP methods in general. 
4.4 Zero-knowledge proofs in Banking 
In October 15 in 2018, ING published a report and subsequently an article [9], an-
nouncing its own addition of ZKP to the blockchain technology. ING Bank is con-
tinuing further down the path of advanced blockchain privacy with the release of its 
Zero-Knowledge Range Proofs (ZKRP) solution. 
The ZKRP scheme proposed can be used to prove a number is within a specific 
range. For example, a mortgage or loan applicant could prove that their salary or cred-
it score sits within a certain range without revealing the exact figure. As such range 
proofs are computationally lighter than regular zero-knowledge proofs and run faster 
on a blockchain. 
Not long after this, ING took the solution a step further and introduced Zero-
Knowledge Set Membership (ZKSM), described in [10], going beyond numerical data 
to include other types of information, like locations and names. For instance, banks 
could validate that a new client lives in a country that belongs to the European Union, 
without revealing the country. Simply put, this technology allows information to be 
shared without revealing contextual details. 
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4.5 Nuclear Disarmament Applcations 
Zero-knowledge methods have been devised originally for computational tasks but 
recently translated into use for a physical system. At the Department of Energy’s 
(DOE) Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) researchers have developed an 
experimental verification protocol for weapon dismantlement agreements [11]. Their 
method includes a system that can compare physical objects while potentially protect-
ing sensitive information about the objects themselves. 
The process to prove two objects are identical - potentially nuclear warheads – is as 
follows: the prover provides two radiographic films already exposed with the inverse 
image of one test object and place them in two individual sealed boxes. The objects 
are placed in front of the boxes and getting radiated. This operation is essentially 
equivalent to adding a positive image on top of a negative image. The verifiers ac-
cepts the proof if both images after radiated are flat gray – meaning there is a 50 per-
cent probability that the objects are indeed identical - otherwise he/she  rejects it. If 
multiple tests are run simultaneously and the inverse images are randomized to the 
transmission pattern of the test object, the probability that they are not identical falls 
even more. The proof is zero-knowledge because the verifier does not learn anything 
beyond the result of the proof. 
4.6 Other Use Cases of ZKPs 
• Ethereum: Ethereum is also working with zk-SNARK proofs since its Byzantium 
update in 2017 [12]. 
• PIVX: PIVX is a Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain-based cryptocurrency created in 
2016. At its core, it relies on fungibility, transaction privacy, and community gov-
ernance. PIVX utilize zero knowledge proofs via ZeroCoin protocols [13]. 
4.7 Possible Use Cases of ZKPs 
There are many areas that can be enhanced by using Zero-Knowledge protocols 
where trust is required and there are large incentives to cheat, such as: 
Chain Voting Models: Voting can refer either to political elections or corporate vot-
ing, where shareholder participation is a longstanding economical pillar. In any voting 
procedure, security, anonymity and trust are of paramount importance since these 
parts are most likely to fail and participation might be lower in the possibility of cen-
sorship. 
These issues can be resolved with a zero-knowledge method. The whole procedure 
can move on a public blockchain. Every eligible voter (or shareholder) can cast their 
ballot without revealing their identity and even more they can ask for verification of 
their vote to ensure their ballot was counted. 
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Running a computation and verifying its results: In the last years there is a trend 
for research centers and enterprises to migrate their data to outside providers. This 
practice raise concerns about the integrity and confidentiality of computations con-
ducted on this data. We can imagine for example, a research medical center who 
wishes to have access in a private data center that contains genetic information of 
individuals, in order to apply a new formula. 
This begs the following question, how we can verify the computations of the for-
mula and at the same time achieve it without disclosing patients’ identity? A Zero-
knowledge method could answer both of these contradictory objects. The data center 
can apply on behalf of the researchers the formula and prove them in zero-knowledge 
the result without compromising the individuals' confidentiality [14]. 
Data Auditing: More and more users and enterprises resort in data centers due to 
storage limitations or for specialized services. Data integrity and availability is of 
major concern for cloud storage services while users uploading their personal data 
together with authentication information. This means users have no longer possession 
of their data that may face risks like loss, corruption or the purchase from a third ser-
vice or company. The same concerns apply also to distributed ledgers. 
Auditing from a third party is critical to prove data centers, financial institutions 
and exchanges are complying with regulations like GDPR. Profiting from zero-
knowledge methods, we can construct protocol schemes to prevent the leakage of 
verified and private data, a problem that existing auditing protocols suffer from and 
can have devastating effects. The reader can find recent research in [15-16]. 
5 Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Zero-knowledge proofs are by definition methods which satisfy the appropriate secu-
rity features that interest us. Attacks and vulnerabilities could be found in the design-
ing of a ZKP protocol or in the system resources that support the realization of such 
features. The former one is most likely to happen since such designing requires a 
higher level of technical and theoretical sophistication that in the process a mathemat-
ical mistake might occur. Such mistakes could go completely unobservable like the 
“Infinite Counterfeiting Vulnerability4”, a mathematical false in a research zk-
SNARKs paper that could irreparably damage the market since other cryptocurrencies 
employ the same algorithms. 
                                                          
4  The story behind it is very interesting and can be found here 
https://dci.mit.edu/research/2019/2/6/dci-director-was-
interviewed-for-fortunes-latest-article-zcash-discloses-
vulnerability-that-could-have-allowed-infinite-counterfeit-
cryptocurrency 
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5.1 Parameter Problem 
zk-SNARKs have undergone significant tinkering and exploration into their real-
world application and efficiency improvements, yet is not a perfect cryptographic 
tool. 
For the zk-SNARKs to work, an initial setup phase is required where the so called 
“system parameters” are generated who act as a common reference string shared be-
tween prover and verifier and need to be built-in in advanced in every zk-SNARK 
implementation. This process is known as a “trusted setup” which is a highly polariz-
ing event. If the parameters get compromised, a malicious user could use it to gener-
ate fake proofs and theoretically create infinite amounts of counterfeit coins of the 
native token (not only for Zcash but for any other crypto currency that adopts the zk-
SNARK technology) without anyone knowing. 
We can imagine a hypothetical scenario where elections take place on a blockchain 
using zk-SNARKs for proving votes. A powerful entity – such as a politician in the 
case of a Presidential vote – would have strong incentives to involve the parties with 
the setup of the zk-SNARK system to share the setup parameters. The entity could tilt 
the election in their intended direction by creating false proofs for votes taking place. 
The biggest problem with the zk-SNARK approach is that users need to implicitly 
trust in the setup phase and the parties involved to setup the system honestly. Users of 
the system will never actually know if the setup phase was compromised at the point 
of setup, or at some point in the future. In other words we could say that the system is 
as much secure as the incentives to circumvent the system are low. So, if this is the 
case, the door remains open for a system where users do not implicitly need to trust 
the parties involved in the system’s setup to be honest. 
5.2 Possible Attacks 
While cryptocurrencies increase their use as an actual currency and payment method 
so the interest for Simple Payment Verification (SPV) increases to support users who 
cannot hold the full blockchain ledger in their mobile devices. As cryptocurrencies 
gear towards portability, software designers have not given much attention to system 
integrity issues, thus system vulnerabilities are often unobservable. One of these dan-
gers are fault attacks5, which potentially could extract data from the CPU or memory 
of a device at the time a ZKP protocol is taking place. 
In [17] the authors demonstrate the first (at the time) fault attack which is initiated 
purely form software – it removes entirely the physical access. A malicious user could 
unleash various vector attacks or a combination of them to induce faults in a CPU 
core while a ZK protocol is under verification. An attacker could fault the steps - and 
the respective data - which a verifier and a prover follow in a ZK protocol, and inter-
cept (modify or destroy) the messages form one another. 
                                                          
5  A fault attack is an attack on a physical electronic device which consists in stressing the 
device by an external mean in order to generates errors in such a way that these errors leads 
to a security failure of the system. 
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6 Solutions 
One way the Zcash team got around the parameter problem was to create a multi-
party computation ceremony [18-19]. During the parameter creation a set of random 
numbers are produced, a process similar to the setup phase of a public-key cryptosys-
tem. Zcash team refers to these random numbers as “toxic waste” to emphasize the 
need to get disposed with extreme caution. Multiple independent parties involved 
collaboratively in the construction of the parameters. It is apparent that it takes all the 
participants of the “ceremony” to be compromised or be dishonest in order to give 
away the parameters. 
Another way to remedy the parameter problem is the choice users have to send to-
kens privately or publicly. Zcash concerning, the privacy features are not obligated, 
but are rather customizable. 
More powerful constructions of zk-SNARKS (and generaly non-interactive ZKPs) 
can rise to the challenge of the parameter setup. One of these, already mention above, 
is zk-STARKS. Another one is zk-ConSNARK which is developed by Suterusu6. 
Suterusu integrates a state of the art zero-knowledge schemes which are scalable and 
free of complex multi-party setup protocols. ConSNARKs can produce a sound 
blockchain ecosystem, absence of manipulation for the users and massively improved 
efficiency. 
7 Discussion 
We start our discussion by noticing first some technical details. The maximum rate, at 
which a blockchain protocol/technology is processed, is determined by the size of it, 
the size of the transaction and the intricacy of the underlying computations, conse-
quently this is determined by the ZKP protocol/technology the blockchain adopts. 
For example the complexity in terms of size of zk-STARKs rises much slower that 
the zk-SNARKs for one-time setup, after this phase SNARKs have much less size 
needed for computation in verifying the proof in faster times. On the other hand zk-
ConSNARKs allows for very small and constant size proof computations, which leads 
to much faster generation and verification times. We could argue that as zero-
knowledge technologies evolve, they push for smaller and smaller and/or constant 
size of proofs that can succeed better verification times [20]. 
Table 1. Comparison of three major ZKPs. Source: Adapted from [21]. 
 Proof Size Prover Time Verification Time 
SNARKs 288 bytes 2.3s 10ms 
STARKs 45KB-200KB 1.6s 16ms 
Bulletproofs ~1.3KB 30s 1100ms 
The above table presents the comparison of three major ZKPs technologies. We 
observe the addition of Bulletproofs [22], this protocol falls under the “range proof” 
                                                          
6  https://www.suterusu.io/ 
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style (as ING’s ZKRP). STARKs are faster than SNARKs which are faster than Bul-
letproofs, but as we go in the opposite direction proofs shrink in size. Bulletproofs are 
much shorter in size than STARKs, a property of much importance, even if we go 
about small differences in the order of hundreds of bytes (from SNARKs) to the order 
of hundreds of kilobytes proof (that of STARKs), it might be a “killer” factor. It 
seems like there is an inherent trade-off between size and speed. This is not the only 
trade off. SNARK is the only protocol that requires a trusted setup, but verifying it is 
less time consuming than Bullerproofs. The same goes for STARKs which do not 
need a trusted setup. We could say that we trade confidetiality for efficient validation. 
In respect to privacy and confidentiality, most zero-knowledge technologies adopt 
zk-SNARKS implementations but all require a trusted setup event, meaning it is a 
one-time event, if a vulnerability or mathematical mistake is to be found, a whole new 
multi-party ceremony needs to be deployed which is an extremely complex proce-
dure. There are few zero-knowledge breakthroughs that have got ridden the obligation 
of an initial setup. 
We can argue, in the context of a zero-knowledge protocol embedded in a system, 
that one rule is applied; the system is only as good as the secret it is trying to conceal. 
8 Does It Make The Cut? (Conclusions) 
So much of our world is dominated by services that gobble up our personal infor-
mation, they abuse these data, they sell it to the highest bidder, they do not protect in 
on their own servers and they essentially leaving it out for ransom. It is vital now 
more than ever before the need for privacy. Zero-Knowledge innovations, like zk-
SNARKs, are up to the task of preserving the confidentiality and the security of users’ 
data. They have the potential to enable trust levels that have never been achieved 
before. On the other side, since ZKPs have been theorized in 1985, it is the last six or 
so years we begun to use it in practice. We are still experimenting and try to under-
stand how most effectively to apply it. It might take years until we manage to harness 
it true potential. 
We still have to overcome many challenges and to observe a broader range of ap-
plications, but there is no doubt we hold in our hands a novel class of technology, one 
that sparks further development and innovation. 
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